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Abstract—Autonomous Vehicle has been transforming intelli-
gent transportation systems. As telecommunication technology
improves, autonomous vehicles are getting connected to each
other and to infrastructures, forming Connected and Autonomous
Vehicles (CAVs). CAVs will help humans achieve safe, efficient,
and autonomous transportation systems. However, CAVs will face
significant security challenges because many of their components
are vulnerable to attacks, and a successful attack on a CAV may
have significant impacts on other CAVs and infrastructures due
to their communications. In this paper, we conduct a survey
on 184 papers from 2000 to 2020 to understand state-of-the-art
CAV attacks and defense techniques. This survey first presents a
comprehensive overview of security attacks and their correspond-
ing countermeasures on CAVs. We then discuss the details of
attack models based on the targeted CAV components of attacks,
access requirements, and attack motives. Finally, we identify some
current research challenges and trends from the perspectives of
both academic research and industrial development. Based on
our studies of academic literature and industrial publications, we
have not found any strong connection between academic research
and industry’s implementation on CAV-related security issues.
While efforts from CAV manufacturers to secure CAVs have been
reported, there is no evidence to show that CAVs on the market
have the ability to defend against some novel attack models that
the research community has recently found. This survey may give
researchers and engineers a better understanding of the current
status and trend of CAV security for CAV future improvement.
Index Terms—Connected and autonomous vehicles, Intelligent
transportation system, Cybersecurity, Traffic engineering
I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous Vehicle (AV) has been a fascinating and im-
pactful application of modern technology and it has been
transforming human’s intelligent transportation systems [1],
[2]. As telecommunication technology improves, the concept
of Connected Vehicles (CVs), which is the idea to connect
vehicles and to communicate with road infrastructures and the
Internet, has been realized and often implemented together
with Autonomous vehicle [3], [4]. Many research studies in
academia and industry have advanced Connected and Au-
tonomous Vehicles (CAVs), aiming toward a safe, driverless,
and efficient transportation system. These advancements have
led to prominent public demonstrations of CAVs in North
America, Japan, and Europe [5]–[8]. There are various levels
of CAV automation, ranging from non-automated to fully
automated. In 2018, the Society of Automobile Engineers
updated the official reference that specifically described the
five levels of vehicle automation [9]. These five levels include
Level 0-no automation, Level 1-driver assistance, Level 2-
partial automation, Level 3-conditional automation, Level 4-
high automation, and Level 5-full automation. In this paper, we
consider automation levels 2, 3, 4, and 5, which are described
by the official document [9] that humans are not fully involved
when the automated driving features are engaged (such as
being hands-off).
A CAV consists of many sensing components, such as laser,
radar, camera, Global Positioning System (GPS), and light
detection and ranging (LiDAR) [10], as well as their connec-
tion mechanisms, such as cellular connection, Bluetooth, IEEE
802.11p Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE)
[11], and Wi-Fi. The sensing components enable a CAV to
navigate in an environment with unknown obstacles. Using
data from these sensing sensors, the surrounding environment
and the vehicle’s location are computed by a system in a
process known as Simultaneous Localization and Mapping
(SLAM) [12], [13]. Connection mechanisms improve the
driving experience or enhance an autonomous driving system
by providing advanced knowledge and a bigger picture of the
environment. Applications that utilize connection mechanisms
include Intelligent Driver-Assistance Systems (IDAS) [14],
safety features through Vehicle-to-Infrastructure communica-
tions [15], and safety features through Vehicle-to-Vehicle
communications [16], [17]. While the sensing components and
connection mechanisms have offered significant improvements
in safety, cost, and fuel efficiency, they also created more
opportunities for cyberattacks.
Attempts to deploy and test CAVs have been carried out
in many places, and they are supported by governments and
corporations. In September 2016, the United States Depart-
ment of Transportation started the Connected Vehicle Pilot
Deployment Program [24], [25], providing over 45 million
USD to Wyoming [26], New York City [27], and Tampa [28]
to begin building connected vehicle programs. In the United
Kingdom, the Centre for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles
has invested 120 million GBP to support over 70 CAVs
projects, with a further 68 million GBP coming from industry
contributions [29]. In China, industry officials estimated that
by 2035, there will be around 8.6 million autonomous vehicles
on the road, of which 5.2 million are semi-autonomous (SAE
levels 3 and 4) and 3.4 million are fully autonomous (SAE
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2level 5) [30]. In Japan, prime minister Shinzo Abe claimed to
grow a fleet of thousands of autonomous vehicles to serve in
Tokyo Olympics 2020 [30]. In South Korea, two competitions
were sponsored by Hyundai Motor Group to stimulate the
development of CAVs [31]. These two competitions were held
in 2010 and 2012, respectively. The development of CAVs is
gaining significant public attention. The unfortunate side effect
of this public attention is that CAVs will probably become
attractive targets for cyberattacks.
Furthermore, CAV engineers and manufacturers need to
have a systematic understanding of the cybersecurity impli-
cations of CAVs. Even though no significant cyberattack has
occurred to the publicly deployed CAV programs, there are
potential security threats to CAVs that have been discovered
largely by the academic research community [32]. These
potential security attacks will be more harmful than attacks
on non-automated transportation systems because drivers may
not be mentally or physically available to take over the
driving, and engineers and technicians may not be available
immediately to recover a compromised system.
Considerable research efforts have been carried out for
identifying vulnerabilities in CAVs, recommending potential
mitigation techniques, and highlighting the potential impacts
of cyberattacks on CAVs and related infrastructures [33]–
[36]. Researchers have identified many vulnerabilities asso-
ciated with sensors, electronic control units, and connection
mechanisms. Some even demonstrated successful cyberattacks
on CAVs and their components that are currently being sold
and operated [37]–[39]. Since detailed and security-focused
studies for CAVs are fairly new in the literature (the majority
of technical and in-depth papers discussed in this survey are
published after 2011), there is an absence of a comprehensive
survey paper that utilizes the current literature to build a
taxonomy and to suggest significant gaps and challenges. For
example, Miller and Valasek (2014) [18] published a survey
paper on attack surfaces but did not have much cover on de-
fense strategies. Thing and Wu (2016) proposed a taxonomy of
attacks and defenses but failed to point out specific examples
in the literature with only 16 references [19]. Other survey
papers that are dedicated to specific components of CAVs
[20], [22], [23]. To our knowledge, Parkinson et al. (2017)
[21] is a state-of-the-art survey paper on this topic. Parkinson
et al.’s paper reviewed 89 publicly accessible publications and
identified knowledge gaps in the literature. However, we found
that the authors missed interesting and important papers on
some attack models and defense strategies, such as ones that
we will cover in the GPS spoofing attacks [40], [41] (section
III-F), defense against LiDAR spoofing [42], [43] (section III-
D), and adversarial input attack on cameras [44], [45] (section
III-G). Meanwhile, Parkinson et al. [21] did not include any
literature published after 2017. We tried our best to explore
and present such technical papers, which are experimented not
only on CAVs but also on related cyber-physical systems (e.g.,
unmanned aerial vehicles). Besides, our survey paper covers
the recent developments of attacks and defenses on CAVs,
including three ethical hacking studies on Tesla and Baidu
autonomous vehicles in 2019. A comparison of survey papers
can be found in Table I.
This survey paper aims to review published papers and
technical reports on cybersecurity vulnerabilities and defenses
of CAVs, to provide readers with a summary of past research
efforts, to organize them into systematic groups, and to identify
research gaps and challenges. We have surveyed 184 papers
from 2000 to 2020 about CAVs and CAV components to
understand the security challenges of CAVs. The first paper
related to the security of CAVs was published in 2005 re-
garding secure software update for CAVs [46]. Since then,
we observed an increasing trend of publications on this issue.
From 2015 to 2019, we counted 8, 11, 14, 17, and 12 published
papers per respective year about CAV-related security issues.
We hope that our work can inform current and aspiring
researchers and engineers of the security issues of CAVs as
well as state-of-the-art defense and mitigation techniques. We
further hope that our work can motivate other researchers to
address cybersecurity challenges facing the development of
CAVs. We acknowledge that research in this area is growing
at a rapid rate. We also realize that some achievements from
academia and industry might have been overlooked or not yet
published. As a result, we observe that many vulnerabilities
do not have enough tested solutions. Given the vast investment
TABLE I: A comparison of survey papers on CAVs
Survey Paper Year Published ReferenceCount
Year of Latest
Reference Focused Topic
High-level
Taxonomy
Outlining
Open-issues
Miller and
Valasek [18]
2014 12 2012 CAVs No No
Thing and Wu
[19]
2016 16 2016 CAVs Yes No
Haider et al. [20] 2016 10 2015 Global
Positioning
System
No No
Parkinson et al.
[21]
2017 91 2016 CAVs No Yes
Tomlinson et al.
[22]
2018 43 2018 Controller Area
Network
Yes Yes
van der Heijden
et al. [23]
2018 126 2018 Misbehavior
detection in
communication
between CAVs
No Yes
This paper 2020 184 2020 CAVs Yes Yes
3and rapid changes in the CAV industry, many individuals
and corporations may not agree with our observations in this
article, but any debate and criticism would be welcomed and
appreciated for the growth of the community.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes the taxonomies of attack and defense according
to the components of CAVs, where those components are also
explained in details. This section would provide readers a brief
overview of the attack and defense techniques appeared in the
existing literature so that readers without technical experience
can have a high-level understanding of those attacks and
defenses. Section 3 discusses the attack techniques, their cor-
responding mitigation/defense techniques, and the challenges
of defenses and the gaps between attack models and defense
techniques. In section 4, we identify the trends, challenges, and
open issues in academic research and industry developments.
II. TAXONOMY OF ATTACKS AND DEFENSES
The purpose of this section is to provide a high-level
overview of the types of attacks and defenses that have
been discussed for CAVs. In this section, we attempt to
classify attack models and defense strategies based on their
characteristics, but do not provide technical details. Instead,
technical details of attack models and defense strategies with
their corresponding references are presented in section III.
Figures 3 and 4, which are presented in section II to point
readers to related parts in section III, may help readers navigate
easily between the two sections.
A. Taxonomy of Attacks
In this section, we discuss the CAV components whose
vulnerabilities have been found in the literature and provide a
high-level overview of the attack models.
1) Attack targets: As discussed in section I, a good CAV
system consists of many sensor components and connection
mechanisms. They work together and contribute to CAVs’
functioning. Compromising or tampering any of these com-
ponents may destabilize a CAV and serve the attacker’s goal,
such as stealing information and causing property damage and
bodily injury. In this subsection, we describe CAV components
that have been targeted by cyber attackers in the literature.
Some attack models have been demonstrated as realistic threats
while the others have only been discussed theoretically. While
section II presents the classification of attacks and defense,
section III gives the detailed discussion of attack models and
defense strategies with their citations. Figure 1 summarizes
the attack targets along with their corresponding subsections
in section III, where readers can find the detailed discussions
of the attack models and the mitigation techniques along with
their references.
On-board Diagnostic Port (OBD) is a connection port
that anyone can use to collect information about a vehicle’s
emissions, mileage, speed, and data on a vehicle’s components.
There are two OBD standards, namely OBD-I and OBD-
II. OBD-I was introduced in 1987 but had many flaws, so
it was replaced by OBD-II introduced in 1996 [47]. OBD-
II port should be found in almost any modern vehicle, and
CAVs are not exceptions. Figure 2 shows the OBD port on
a Tesla Model X (SAE level 2). Modern OBD ports can
provide real-time data [48]. OBD also provides a pathway
to acquire data from CAV’s Electronic Control Units and
possibly to modify the software embedded in those control
units. Many manufacturers also use OBD ports to perform
firmware updates [33]. Attack models on OBD ports and their
corresponding mitigation techniques are discussed in Section
III-A.
Electronic Control Units (ECUs) are embedded electronic
systems that control other subsystems in a vehicle. All modern
vehicles use ECUs to control vehicular functionalities by
acquiring electronic signals from other components, as well as
processing, and sending control signals. Some important ECUs
are Brake Control Module, Engine Control Module, Tire-
pressure Monitor Systems, and Inertial Measurement Units.
Their functionalities are as follows. The Brake Control Module
collects data from wheel-speed sensors and the brake system,
as well as processes the data to determine whether or not to
release braking pressure in real-time [49]. The Engine Control
Module controls fuel, air, and spark, as well as collects data
from many sensors around the vehicle to ensure that all com-
ponents are within a normal operating range [49]. The Tire-
pressure Monitor Systems collect data from sensors within
tires and determine if the tire pressures are at ideal levels. The
United States has legally required all vehicles to be equipped
with Tire-pressure Monitor Systems since 2007 [50], and the
European Union issued the same regulation in 2012 [51]. The
Inertial Measurement Units collect data from accelerometers,
magnetometers, and gyroscopes and calculate the vehicle’s
velocity, acceleration, angular rate, and orientation. These
calculations are pivotal for CAVs because they serve as inputs
for running a safe automated driving system [52]. For example,
a change in road gradient would change a CAV’s angular rate
and orientation, and the automated driving system may issue
an adjustment in a vehicle’s speed to maintain safe operations.
CAVs involve a larger number of ECUs than a non-automated
vehicle (SAE level 2 and below) because they possess many
more sensors and require many more calculations to make
autonomous decisions in driving. Readers may think of ECUs
in CAVs as mini-computers, each carries out a specific role
and collaborates with others to perform autonomous driving. It
is common to see complex collaborations between ECUs [34].
Attack models and defense strategies on ECUs are discussed
in section III-B. Communications between ECUs happen on
Controller Area Networks, which will be discussed as follows.
Controller Area Network (CAN). ECUs are typically con-
nected through a CAN. In a vehicle, the CAN is a central net-
work to connect ECUs together so that they can communicate
with each other. A CAN bus is typically structured as a two-
wire and half-duplex network system that can support high-
speed communication [53]. The greatest benefits of CANs are
the low amount of wiring and the ingenious prevention of
message loss and message collision [53]. In CAVs, network
packets are transmitted to all the nodes in the CAV network,
and the packets do not contain an authentication field or source
identification field [19]. Therefore, a compromised node can
collect all data being transferred through the network and
4Fig. 1: Possible attack targets on CAVs
Fig. 2: OBD port on Tesla Model X
broadcast malicious data to other nodes, making the entire
CAN vulnerable to cyberattacks. Attack models and defense
strategies on CANs are discussed in section III-C.
Sensors. The following sensors are crucial to CAVs and are
often found in most CAVs. All of the sensors discussed below
will have their vulnerabilities discussed in Section III.
• Light Detection And Ranging (LiDAR) are sensors
that use light to measure the distance to surrounding
objects. LiDAR sensors operate by sending light waves
to probe the surrounding environment and make measure-
ments based on reflected signals [54]. The light beam’s
wavelength varies to suit the purpose and ranges from
10 micrometers (infrared light) to approximately 250
nanometers (ultraviolet light) [54]. In CAVs, LiDAR is of-
ten used for obstacle detection to navigate safely through
environments and is often implemented by rotating laser
beams [55]. Data from LiDAR can be used by software
embedded in ECUs to determine whether there are ob-
stacles in the environment, as well as by autonomous
emergency braking systems [56]. Attacks and defense
techniques on LiDAR are described in section III-D.
• Radio Detection and Ranging (Radar) are sensors that
send out electromagnetic waves in the radio or microwave
domain to detect objects and measure their distance and
speed by sensing the reflected signals. In CAVs, radars
are useful in many applications. For example, short-range
radars enable blind-spot monitoring [57], lane-keeping
assistance [58], and parking aids [59]. Long-range radars
assist in automatic distance control [60] and brake assis-
tance [61]. Attacks and defense techniques on radars are
described in section III-E.
• Global Positioning System (GPS) is a satellite-based
navigation system that is funded and owned by the United
States government, is operated and maintained by the
United States Air Force [62]. It is a global navigation
system that operates based on the satellites in the Earth’s
orbit that transmit high-frequency radio signals. The
radio signals may be sensed by many devices such as
smartphones and GPS receivers in CAVs. When GPS re-
ceivers find signals from three or more satellites, they can
compute their locations. Since finding a route between
two locations is necessary for autonomous driving, GPS
signals are critical to CAVs. GPS receivers can operate
without any communication channel such as wireless net-
works, but data from wireless networks can often enhance
GPS receivers’ accuracy [63]. Since GPS signals do not
contain any data that can directly authenticate the source
of signals, GPS receivers are vulnerable to jamming and
spoofing attacks. These attacks and mitigation techniques
are described in section III-F.
• Cameras (image sensors) are widely applied in CAVs.
Autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles (SAE level 2
and above) rely on cameras placed on many positions to
5acquire a 360-degree view around the vehicle. Cameras
provide information for important autonomous tasks such
as traffic sign recognition [64]–[66] and lane detection
[67], [68]. Cameras can also be used to replace LiDAR
for the task of object detection and for measuring distance
at a lower cost, but they have poor performance under
specific situations such as rain, fog, or snow [69]. To-
gether with LiDAR and radars, cameras provide abundant
and diverse data for autonomous driving. Attack models
on cameras and mitigation techniques are described in
section III-G.
Connection Mechanisms in CAVs can be divided into
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I)
networking. V2V communications help exchange data be-
tween nearby vehicles and can quickly provide additional in-
formation to the data already collected by a CAV regarding its
surrounding environment. This additional data can lead to safer
and more efficient autonomous driving. V2I communications
help exchange data between CAVs and road infrastructures,
which provide data about the bigger picture of the transporta-
tion system, such as smart traffic signs (without the need to
do image recognition) and safety warnings in a large region
[70]. V2V communications often follow the Vehicular Ad-hoc
NETworks (VANET) paradigm, where each vehicle acts as a
network node and can independently interact with other nodes
through a wireless connection [71]. The wireless connections
used are often dedicated short-range communications (DSRC)
and cellular networks [72]. A well-known example of DSRC is
the IEEE 802.11p Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments
(WAVE) [11], [73]. WAVE is described in detail by Kenney
(2011) [74]. V2I communications are often achieved by using
cellular networks, where Long-Term Evolution (LTE) is the
current standard [72]. Attack models on V2V and V2I net-
works and defense techniques are discussed in section III-H.
2) Classifications of Attack Models: We can categorize the
attack models, described in details in section III, by their
access requirements and by their motives.
Access Requirement: attack models can be performed
remotely (remote-access attacks) or can only be performed
with physical access to CAV components (physical-access
attacks).
• Remote-access attacks: Attackers do not need to phys-
ically modify parts on CAVs or attach instruments to
CAVs. Attacks can be launched from a distance, such as
from another vehicle. Three common patterns for remote-
access attacks are sending counterfeit data, blocking
signals, and collecting confidential data. Examples of
sending counterfeit data can be found in section III-D-
Attack Model 1, section III-E-Attack Model 1, section
III-F-Attack Model 1, and section III-G-Attack Model 2.
Examples of attacks that block signals are described in
section III-D-Attack Model 2, section III-E-Attack Model
2, section III-F-Attack Model 2, and section III-G-Attack
Model 1. Examples of attacks that collect confidential
data can be found in section III-H-Attack Model 1.
Readers may refer to these sections for more details.
• Physical-access attacks: Attackers need to physically
modify components on CAVs or attach instruments to
CAVs. Examples of these attacks are reprogramming
ECU (section III-A and section III-C-Attack Model 1)
and falsifying input data (section III-B-Attack Model 1).
Physical-access attacks are more difficult to carry out
because attackers may be detected when tampering with
CAVs.
For easier navigation through this paper, a summary of access
requirements to perform attacks on the aforementioned CAV
components is presented in Figure 3, annotated with the
corresponding parts in section III for more details. CAN and
ECUs can be targets for both remote-access and physical-
access attacks.
Attack Motivations: Three common attack motivations are
to interrupt (but without control) CAVs’ operation, to control
CAVs as attackers’ wishes, or to steal information.
• Interrupting operations: attackers aim to corrupt CAV
components that are important for autonomous driving,
thus making the autonomous driving mode unavailable on
CAVs. These attacks are analogous to Denial-of-Service
attacks on networks. Examples can be found in III-D-
Attack Model 2, section III-E-Attack Model 2, section
III-F-Attack Model 2, section III-G-Attack Model 1, and
section III-H-Attack Model 2.
• Gaining control over CAVs: attackers gain sufficient
control over CAVs so that they can alter the vehicles’
movements, such as changing the vehicle’s route, forcing
emergency brake, and changing vehicle speed. Examples
of these attacks can be found in section III-D-Attack
Model 1, section III-E-Attack Model 1, section III-F-
Attack Model 1, and section III-G-Attack Model 2.
• Stealing information: attackers’ goal is to collect im-
portant and/or confidential information from CAVs. Col-
lected information may be used for further attacks. Exam-
ples of this type of attack can be found in section III-B,
section III-C, and section III-H-Attack Model 1.
For easier navigation through this paper, a summary of
attack motives is presented in Figure 4, annotated with the
corresponding parts in section III for more details.
Finally, for each attack model described in section III, we
show its targeted CAV component, access requirement, and
attack motives in Table II.
B. Taxonomy of Defenses
In this section, We attempt to organize the defense tech-
niques into categories that have certain patterns. Some defense
categories are generally effective against certain types of at-
tacks, but we suggest that readers study defense techniques for
attacks on a case-by-case basis. For example, attacks that pre-
vent sensors from receiving legitimate signals can usually be
mitigated by the abundance of information, through planting
multiple sensors or through acquiring additional information
from V2V or v2I connections, but this does not hold for the
case of GPS jamming (section III-F-Attack Model 2).
The categories for defense techniques are as follows.
• Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is
a method that is designed to detect unauthorized access
or counterfeit data. IDS methods generally look to detect
6Fig. 3: Access requirements to attack some CAV components
Fig. 4: Attack motives
abnormal data from the signals or side-channel informa-
tion. For example, Cho et al. (2016) [75] proposed Clock-
based IDS (CIDS), which measures the clock skew of
ECUs (the phenomenon in which the clock signal arrives
at different ECU at slightly different times) and uses
this information to fingerprint the ECUs. The fingerprints
are then used to detect intrusions by checking for any
abnormal shifts in the clock skews. IDS methods are
generally applicable in attack models that rely on sending
counterfeit signals, such as CAN attacks (section III-
B), LiDAR spoofing (section III-D-Attack Model 1),
radar spoofing (section III-E-Attack Model 1), and GPS
spoofing (section III-F-Attack Model 1). However, they
are not effective to defend against adversarial image
attacks on cameras (section III-G-Attack Model 2).
• The abundance of information can be achieved by
getting information from other CAVs and infrastructures
or by setting up abundant information within a CAV. This
is good not only for defending against cyberattacks but
also for increasing confidence in autonomous driving.
This category of defense strategy is generally effective
against Denial-of-Service type of attacks, such as LiDAR
jamming (section III-D-Attack Model 2), radar jamming
(section III-D-Attack Model 2), and camera blinding
(section III-G-Attack Model 1). For example, by using
multiple LiDAR sensors with different wavelengths, a
CAV is protected from attackers who send high-power
light beams to blind LiDAR sensors. However, this
method is not effective against GPS jamming (section
III-F-Attack Model 2). A major drawback of this defense
category is that placing abundant components on CAVs
is expensive.
• Encryption methods can be applied to defend against
attacks that abuse components that lack authentication
methods, such as CANs and signals for sensors. Many
encryption methods have been published to secure CAN
and sensor signals, such as those in [76]–[79] (they
will be discussed in detail in section III). However, an
encryption method is not applicable for GPS receivers
because it is too expensive to modify the satellites so
that they can send encrypted radio signals. This makes
defending against GPS jamming attacks a difficult task
(section III-F-Attack Model 2).
Some defense techniques are unique and do not fall into
any of these categories, which is why we suggest that readers
study defense techniques on a case-by-case basis.
7TABLE II: Classification of CAV attack models
Sub-section in section
III
Targeted CAV
component
Access
requirement Attack motives
III-A OBD Physical Interrupting operations, Gaining Control
over CAVs, Stealing Information
III-B Attack Model 1 CAN Physical Interrupting operations, Gaining Control
over CAVs, Stealing Information
III-B Attack Model 2 CAN Remote Interrupting operations, Gaining Control
over CAVs, Stealing Information
III-C Attack Model 1 ECU Physical Interrupting operations, Gaining Control
over CAVs, Stealing Information
III-C Attack Model 2 ECU Remote Interrupting operations, Gaining Control
over CAVs, Stealing Information
III-D Attack Model 1 LiDAR Remote Gaining Control over CAVs
III-D Attack Model 2 LiDAR Remote Interrupting operations
III-E Attack Model 1 Radar Remote Gaining Control over CAVs
III-E Attack Model 2 Radar Remote Interrupting operations
III-F Attack Model 1 GPS Remote Gaining Control over CAVs
III-F Attack Model 2 GPS Remote Interrupting operations
III-G Attack Model 1 Camera Remote Gaining Control over CAVs
III-G Attack Model 2 Camera Remote Interrupting operations
III-H Attack Model 1 Connection Mechanism Remote Interrupting operations
III-H Attack Model 2 Connection Mechanism Remote Gaining Control over CAVs
III. EXISTING ATTACKS AND THEIR COUNTERMEASURES
One compromised component of CAVs may allow attackers
to compromise other components, other CAVs, and infrastruc-
tures, thus forming a sequence of attacks. From our reading of
the literature, we have come up with possible attack sequences
that attackers may perform and present them in Figure 5. The
attack sequences plotted in Figure 5 are:
• Sequence with label (1): Attackers gain physical access
to OBD ports, which gives them access to CANs and
subsequently access to ECUs.
• Sequence with label (2): Attackers compromise LiDAR,
radar, GPS, or cameras and send adversarial information
to ECUs.
• Sequence with label (3): Attackers compromise telematics
ECUs (ones that have access to communication channels
such as VANET, Bluetooth, and DSRC). Attackers can
then send adversarial information through the CAN to
other ECUs.
• Sequence with label (4): Attackers can send adversarial
information from their CAVs or CAVs that have been
compromised.
The possibility that attackers may compromise one CAV
component after another means that in order to enhance the
security of CAVs, manufacturers should enhance the security
of all CAV components.
Each of the following subsections describes attack model(s)
for a specific CAV component. In each subsection, we describe
the attack models, the security requirements for defense tech-
niques against the attack models, existing defense techniques
in the literature and whether they meet the security require-
ments, and challenges for defending against the attack models.
We number the attack models for easier reference to section
II and include short descriptions as the names of the attack
models. For example, in section III-B, Attack Model 1 -
CAN access through OBD would be referred as ”III-B Attack
Model 1” in section II and this attack models happen through
physical access to the OBD port.
A. Attacks on OBD
Attack Model 1 - malicious OBD devices: The OBD
port is an open gateway for many attacks to other CAV
components because the port usually does not encrypt data
or control access. Since the OBD port itself has no capability
of remote connection, attackers would need physical access
to the OBD port to perform these attacks. Some devices
that are plugged into the OBD port can transfer data to a
computer through wired or wireless connections. Some of
these devices were made by car manufacturers for diagnostic
purposes and firmware updates. Some examples of these
devices are Honda’s HDS, Toyota’s TIS, Nissan’s Consult
3, and Ford’s VCM [33]. Some other devices are developed
by third-party companies to connect vehicles to smartphones
(i.e. self-diagnostic purpose), such as Telia Sense [80] and
AutoPi [81]. Studies have been done to assess the feasibility of
using these third-party devices to perform a meaningful attack.
Marstorp and Lindstro¨m (2017) [82] found that Telia Sense is a
well secured system whereas Christensen and Dannberg (2019)
[83] successfully performed a man-in-the-middle attack, where
they intercepted data to and from the AutoPi Cloud interface.
After gaining access to the OBD port, attackers can interrogate
information about the CAV, controlling key components (such
as warning light [84], windows lift, airbag control system, horn
[34]), and injecting codes to ECUs [85]. Koscher et al. (2011)
[34] successfully performed one such attack on a running
vehicle by using a self-written program named CARSHARK
to compromise many components on the vehicle. In [86], it
was shown that if attackers can trick drivers into downloading
a malicious self-diagnostic application on their smartphones,
attackers can transmit an ECU-controlling data frame through
the OBD device to the vehicle’s ECUs.
8Fig. 5: Possible attack sequences on the components of CAVs
Criteria for Defense Strategies: Defense may take place at
the OBD level, or at CAN and ECUs level. Criteria for defense
strategies at CAN and ECUs are discussed in their respective
subsections (III-B and III-C). Here, we discuss the criteria for
securing the OBD port. Based on our understanding of the
attack model and study on the defense techniques, we suggest
the following criteria.
• Authenticity of OBD devices: before being granted access
to a CAV’s data, OBD devices must come from a trusted
manufacturer
• Integrity of OBD devices: they must be provable that
they have not been compromised or corrupted after their
creation.
• Privacy of OBD devices: any information gained from
the OBD port is intelligible only to the device’s intended
party.
• The authentication process of OBD devices should be
efficient to not cause significant delay to users.
Existing Defense Strategies: Unfortunately, we have not
found any significant method in the literature to secure the
OBD port and to detect malicious devices. However, defense
strategies for CAN and ECUs are abundant. Defense strate-
gies to detect abnormal activities from OBD ports can be
implemented in CANs and ECUs and are described in their
respective subsections. Fowler et al. (2017) [87] proposed
using hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) equipment to collect and
simulate data on attacks through an OBD port. The HIL
technique is not a defense layer on OBD ports but provide
a virtual environment for further testing attack and defense
mechanisms for the OBD port.
Challenges for defending against this attack model:
Because OBD ports are commonly used by car manufacturers
for diagnostics and firmware updates, and by other companies
for data collection purposes, it is difficult to distinguish legit-
imate from malicious OBD devices. No study has proposed
putting a layer of defense in the OBD port and this remains
a challenging problem.
B. Attacks on CAN
Attack Model 1 - CAN access through OBD: Since CAN
protocols generally do not support encrypting messages for
authentication and confidentiality [88], attackers can perform
three types of attack as follows.
• Eavesdrop: CAN messages can be observed from the
OBD port [88].
• Replay attack and unauthorized data transmission [76]:
Once attackers have observed all messages transmitted
on the CAN bus, they can easily impersonate an ECU
and transmit counterfeit messages through OBD ports.
• Denial of Service attack [88]. Attackers can send many
messages with high priority through OBD ports and
prevent CAN from processing other messages on the
CAN bus.
It is important to note that all of these attacks require physical
access to the OBD port.
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Based on our understanding of the attack model and study on
the defense techniques, we suggest the following criteria.
• Confidentiality/privacy of CAN messages: CAN mes-
sages should be readable by only the intended receiving
ECUs. A message sent through CAN is received by all
ECUs connected to that CAN and each ECU decides
whether to use it by checking the identifier of the mes-
sage [89]. This may allow attackers to conclude private
information such as driving behavior or the state of the
vehicle.
• Authenticity of CAN messages: CAN messages should
only be sent from verified ECUs connect to that CAN
to prevent unauthorized data transmission and Denial of
Service attacks.
• Low requirement for computing resources: the authenti-
cation and verification process of CAN messages should
be done efficiently to ensure real-time performance of the
entire CAV system.
Existing Defense Strategies against Attack Model 1:
Wolf et al. (2006) [90] proposed a secure CAN protocol that
achieved authenticity and confidentiality by using Symmet-
ric Key Encryption and Public Key Encryption. Lin et al.
(2012) [76] and Nilsson et al. (2008) [91] also proposed
to achieve authenticity by using the Message Authentication
Code (MAC) method. Herrewege et al. (2011) [78] proposed
an authentication protocol named CANAuth, which also uses
MAC for authentication but utilizes an out-of-band channel to
send more authentication data in a real-time environment. Even
with the out-of-band channel, Herrewege et al. acknowledge
that public-key cryptography is not viable due to its large
key size requirement. Matsumoto et al (2012). [88] criticized
that the aforementioned cryptographic methods suffer from
key management issues (e.g. leakage of secret keys) and may
not be fast enough to achieve real-time response in a moving
vehicle. Halabi and Artail (2018) [79] aimed to solve these
problems by proposing lightweight symmetrical encryption
where the keys are generated based on a CAN frame’s payload
and the previous key.
IDS-based defense techniques are popular. Mu¨ter et al.
(2011) [92] proposed calculating the entropy of a CAN bus
during normal activities; significant deviations in entropy are
then used to detect attacks. Similarly, Miller et al. (2014) [18]
proposed using a small device that connects to the OBD port,
collects traffic data, and detects abnormal traffic patterns with
machine learning. When the device detects an attack, it stops
the circuit on the CAN bus and disables all CAN messages.
Matsumoto et al. (2012) [88] proposed a solution where all
ECUs attempt to detect unauthorized messages by monitoring
all messages being transmitted on the CAN bus. For each
ECU, a flag is implemented within the CAN controller that
would indicate whether the ECU is trying to send a message.
Then, the timing of the flag being switched is measured to
detect unauthorized messages. Shin and Cho (2017) [75], [93]
proposed a similar method, where they measured the intervals
of periodic CAN messages and used these measurements to
detect abnormal messages. Gmiden et al. (2016) [94] criticized
that Matsumoto’s method requires modifications to each ECU
and thus is an expensive solution. Gmiden et al. then proposed
an IDS that checks the identity of each ECU that send CAN
messages and calculates the time since the last message from
the same ECU was observed. If the new time interval is
significantly shorter than the previous time intervals from
the same CAN ID, an alert of attack is raised. Tyree et al.
(2018) [95] proposed an IDS that uses the correlations between
ECU messages to estimate the state of the vehicle. A sudden
change to an ECU’s messages would raise an alert that the
ECU is compromised. If an attacker successfully compromises
many ECUs, the sudden change in the state of the vehicle
is used to detect the attack. Many more types of IDS for
CAN can be found in Tomlinson’s survey paper about this
topic [22]. Siddiqui et al. (2017) [96] proposed a hardware-
based framework that implements mutual authentication and
encryption over the CAN Bus.
Challenges for defending against Attack Model 1: Re-
quirements for a good defense method against Attack Model
1 are real-time response, accuracy, and low degree of mod-
ification needed on the vehicle. Even though many defense
mechanisms have been proposed in the literature [22], there
also exist criticisms to most of them as discussed in the previ-
ous two paragraphs. It is difficult to determine the best defense
strategies to implement in an operating CAV. Therefore, there
is a need for comparative studies that are performed on moving
vehicles to serve as recommendations for CAV manufacturers.
In addition, CAN standards may carry legacy and thus may
not have the capacity to accommodate the computing demand
and communication constraints to these innovative solutions.
Attack Model 2 - CAN access from telematics ECUs:
One may attack a CAN by compromising a member ECU first.
Some ECUs could be compromised without access to the CAN
because they have other access points through connection
mechanisms such as Bluetooth and cellular networking. The
compromised ECU can then send authenticated messages
that can bypass the cryptographic and IDS-based defense
mechanisms discussed in Attack Model 1. More details about
how telematics ECUs are compromised and studies that have
implemented this attack model are presented in subsection C.
Criteria for Defense Strategies against Attack Model
2: Defense strategies may be implemented on the CAN to
detect abnormal ECU behaviors, or may be implemented on
telematics ECUs to prevent compromise. Here, we discuss the
second approach and leave the first approach for section III-C.
The criteria for a defense strategy to be implemented on CAN
are:
• Enforce integrity of messages sent through CAN under
the possibility that a connected ECU is compromised (and
thus any authenticity test is invalid).
• Efficient verification process to not interrupt system-wide
service.
Existing Defense Strategies against Attack Model 2
When attackers have successfully compromised an ECU, they
may be able to send encrypted and authenticated messages
through the CAN. Therefore, cryptographic methods discussed
in Attack Model 1 such as Symmetric Key Encryption, Public
Key Encryption, and MAC may not be able to detect the
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attack. Some IDS-based defense techniques would not be
useful either. For example, Matsumoto’s method [88] and
Gmiden’s method [94] may not work because messages being
sent from the compromised ECU would not create any timing
abnormality. Other IDS-based approaches, such as Mu¨ter’s
[92], Miller’s [18], and Tyree’s [95], may work because they
attempt to model the traffic patterns and state of the vehicles,
thus we speculate that they may acquire essential information
to detect abnormal messages from the compromised ECU. A
probably better strategy of defense is to secure the telematics
ECUs. Securing telematics ECUs are discussed in the next
subsection about ECUs.
Challenges for defending against Attack Model 2: As
previously discussed, there are two approaches to defend
against Attack Model 2: securing telematics ECUs [77], [97]
and using IDS-based algorithms to detect abnormal traffic
patterns from the compromised telematics ECUs [18], [92],
[95]. Implementing both approaches in a CAV would increase
the security against this attack model. However, it is still
unclear how effective these approaches will be and how
difficult they are to be implemented.
C. Attacks on Electronic Control Units
Attack Model 1 - ECU access through CAN: Attackers
compromise ECUs through their access to CAN. As previously
discussed, after gaining access to CAN through the OBD port
or telematics ECUs, attackers may compromise other ECUs on
the CAN. Examples of attack techniques are falsifying input
data [34], code injection and reprogramming ECUs [89], [98].
Existing Defense Strategies against Attack Model 1: have
been discussed in sections regarding OBD and CAN (III-A and
III-B).
Attack Model 2 - ECU access through connection mech-
anisms: Attackers compromise a telematics ECUs through
their connection mechanisms. We have found two examples
of this attack model in the literature. First, Checkoway et al.
(2011) [33] were able to get remote code executions on a
telematics unit of a vehicle through Bluetooth and long-range
wireless connection (chapters 4.3 and 4.4 on the cited paper,
respectively). The authors achieved this result by extracting the
ECUs’ firmware and using disassembly (a computer program
that decompiles machine code into assembly language) to
reverse-engineer the code. After assessing the firmware of
the ECU that is responsible for Bluetooth connections, the
authors hypothesized that if attackers can pair their smart-
phones with the Bluetooth ECU, they can compromise the
ECU by sending malicious code through their smartphones.
For example, after re-engineering the operating system of the
ECU that is responsible for handling Bluetooth connections,
Checkoway et al. found over 20 insecure calls to strcpy,
one of which would allow them to copy data to the stack
and thus to execute any code on the ECU. Second, Nilsson
et al. (2008) [77] described another pathway for attacking
telematics ECUs as follows. Many CAV manufacturers are
performing firmware updates over the air (FOTA) for ECUs
[99]. The FOTA process works as follows. The firmware is first
downloaded over a wireless network connection to a trusted
station, then transferred to the vehicle, and finally transferred
to the ECUs. The firmware transferring process can be secured
by using protocols described in [46], [100], but the installation
process is not secured. Therefore, the downloaded firmware
is vulnerable to susceptible to adversarial modification by a
time-of-check-to-time-of-use attack (TOCTTOU), as described
in [101]. The TOCTTOU attack works as follows. Given the
benign firmware update File B that is expected by the check-
install code. The attacker also prepares malicious File M and
constructs a storage device that can observe the read requests
to File B. For the first access to File B, the mass storage device
serves the legitimate File B. This first access is likely to serve
the purpose of calculating and comparing the cryptographic
hashes. After the verification process succeeds, the storage
device serves the malicious File M for the installation phase.
The attack succeeds if the check code verifies the benign file
File B and then install the malicious File M for the ECU’s
firmware update.
Criteria for Defense Strategies against Attack Model 2:
Based on our understanding of the attack model and study on
the defense techniques, we suggest the following criteria.
• Robust code on ECUs’ firmware to avoid code injection.
• Restrict access to connect to telematics ECUs, i.e.,
only accept connections from trusted and authenticated
sources.
• Robust firmware update protocols for ECUs that assure
integrity and authenticity of the firmware updates.
Existing Defense Strategies against Attack Model 2:
Checkoway et al. [33] did not discuss specific defense strategy
against their attack model through Bluetooth and wireless
connection, but did mention that robust code and firmware
update protocols for ECUs are necessary. Seshadri et al. (2006)
[97] and Nilsson et al. (2008) [77] proposed a protocol to
secure the ECUs’ FOTA. In [77], the secure protocol can be
summarized as follows. First, the trusted station generates a
random value and combines it with fragments of the firmware
update to create a chain. The chain is then hashed repeatedly
and the final hash value serves as the verification code. Next,
the firmware, the random value, and the verification code
are transferred to the vehicle over a secure channel and the
hashing process is performed again to validate the integrity
of the firmware. In [97], the authors proposed Indisputable
Code Execution (ICE), which is a protocol to securely execute
codes on a network node from a trusted station. ICE consists of
three steps: checking the integrity of the firmware update code,
setting up an environment in which once the firmware update
is executed, no other code is allowed to be executed, and
executing the firmware update within the safe environment.
Challenges for defending against Attack Model 2: We
have not found any study that implements the frameworks
described in [77] and [97] to secure FOTA. A study to
validate these frameworks in a realistic CAV environment is
still needed as these publications only presented theoretical
frameworks.
D. Attacks on LiDAR
Attack Model 1 - LiDAR spoofing: An attacker can
record legitimate signals sent from a LiDAR sensor and relay
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the signals to another LiDAR sensor of the same CAV to
make real objects appear closer or further than their actual
locations. Another variation of this attack model is when an
attacker creates counterfeit signals that represent an object
and inject the counterfeit signals into a LiDAR sensor. Both
of these variations have been successfully demonstrated by
Petit et al. (2015) [36] at a low financial cost. The authors
performed the spoofing attack as follows. The attacker uses
two transceivers B and C. The output of B is a voltage signal
that corresponds to the intensity of the pulse sent by the
LiDAR device being attacked. The output of B is sent to C,
which in turn emits a pulse to the LiDAR device. The total
cost of these two transceivers was 49.9 US Dollars! Despite
the low cost, the authors managed to make the vehicle’s ECU
(one that receives input from a LiDAR sensor) think that it is
approaching a large object and initiate emergency brake. The
second attack variation was more difficult to perform, as it
requires the attacker to send the counterfeit signals within a
small window after a LiDAR sensor sends its signal. Shin et al.
(2017) [102] performed this attack variation on a stand-alone
LiDAR sensor, Velodyne’s VLP-16. Cao et al. (2019) [38]
concluded from their experiments that the machine learning-
based object detection process made it difficult to perform a
LiDAR spoofing attack. Nevertheless, the authors formulated
an optimization model for the process of generating counterfeit
inputs. They performed a case study on the Baidu Apollo’s
software module and was able to force an emergency brake,
reducing the vehicle’s speeding from 43 km/h to 0 in a second.
The authors claimed that their attack model can have a success
rate of 75%.
Criteria for Defense Strategies against Attack Model 1:
Based on our understanding of the attack model and study on
the defense techniques, we suggest the following criteria.
• Low cost: A trivial solution for defending against this
attack model is to have redundant LiDAR devices on the
vehicle to make it more difficult for attackers to spoof all
devices simultaneously. However, the cost for this solu-
tion is proportional to the number of redundant LiDAR
devices and thus this solution may not be appealing for
manufacturers.
• High immediacy: The solution should not take too long
to detect a spoofing attack. This also implies that the
solution should be computationally efficient.
• Signal filter: a solution that can detect spoofing attacks
may be sufficient, but a solution that can filter out
legitimate signals among adversarial signals would be
even more appealing.
Existing Defense Strategies against Attack Model 1:
Shin et al. [102] proposed a few defense strategies such as
using multiple sensors having overlapping views, reducing the
signal-receiving angle, transmitting pulses in random direc-
tions, and randomizing the pulses’ waveforms. Nevertheless,
the authors also pointed out that these defense strategies do
not match all the aforementioned criteria. Using multiple
sensors is expensive. Reducing the signal-receiving angle is
also expensive because it requires more LiDAR devices to
cover the entire space around the vehicle. Transmitting pulses
in random directions is feasible and inexpensive, but does
not have good immediacy because the LiDAR device would
have to send many unused pulses. Randomizing the pulses’
waveforms and rejecting pulses different from the transmitted
one is probably the most appealing solution thanks to its low
cost and high immediacy. Approaches of this type have also
been studied intensively and applied for military radars [103].
In a 2016 study on LiDAR spoofing on Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV), Davidson et al. (2016) [104] proposed using
LiDAR data in previous frames to formulate a momentum
model that aims to detect adversarial inputs. The model utilizes
the random sample consensus (RANSAC) method and works
as follows. Let vdiff = (dx1, dy1), (dx2, dy2), ... be the
vector of motion that contain features from LiDAR object
detection. RANSAC randomly samples k features and forms
a hypothesis for each of them. The hypothesis hj for vector
(dxj , dyj) is the ground truth motion for vector (dxj , dyj).
Then, we let all other features vote for each of these k
hypotheses. For a feature motion (dxj , dyj) to vote for a
hypothesis hj , the two motion vectors need to be similar such
that |(dxi − dxj , dyi − dyj)|1 < threshold. The RANSAC
method performs many realizations of this process and then
picks the hypothesis with the highest vote to be the final
hypothesis for the frame, and the corresponding features to
be the ground truth of the frame. The shortcoming of this
solution, which the authors also acknowledged in the paper,
is that it would take some time to build up the weights for
the model and would require high computational power. Thus,
the solution is not immediate. In 2018, Matsumura et al. [105]
proposed a mitigation technique that embeds the authentication
data onto the light wave itself. The fingerprinting is obtained
by modulating LiDAR’s laser light with information from a
cryptographic device, such as an AES encryption circuit. This
defense strategy is interesting because it is cost-effective to
implement and the authors claimed that attackers cannot make
a distance-decreasing attack larger than 30 cm. It is important
to note that Cao’s study (2019) [38] on an attack model was
published after Matsumura’s defense strategy (2018) [105] but
did not discuss this defense strategy any other countermeasure.
In 2020, Porter et al. [] proposed adding dynamic watermark-
ing to LiDAR signals to validate measurements. This solution
has the potential to satisfy all the three aforementioned criteria.
Challenges for defending against Attack Model 1: Cao’s
attack model may be considered state-of-the-art for its newness
and effectiveness. Matsumura’s countermeasure is also novel
and recent [105]. It will be an interesting study to implement
Matsumura’s strategy against Cao’s attack model [38]. David-
son’s proposed method for UAV [104] may also be worth
an experiment on CAVs. Porter et al.’s solution shows good
potential and will be interesting for the community to discuss.
Attack Model 2 - LiDAR jamming: Attackers aim to
perform a Denial-of-Service attack by sending out light with
the same wavelength but with higher intensity and effectively
preventing the sensor from acquiring the legitimate light wave.
This technique has been used by civilians who aim to avoid
speeding tickets by jamming police’s speed gun (a LiDAR
device) [106]. In the context of CAV attacks, Stottelaar (2015)
[107] successfully performed a jamming attack on a LiDAR
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sensor (Ibeo Lux3) and argued that such an attack on a CAV’s
LiDAR sensor is possible. We have not found any other
study or experiment on LiDAR jamming in the literature.
Nevertheless, the attack process, as described in detail in
[107], is relatively straightforward and should not require
much training to replicate.
Criteria for Defense Strategies against Attack Model 2:
Based on our understanding of the attack model and study on
the defense techniques, we suggest the following criteria.
• Low cost: The solution should not require expensive
modification to the vehicle
• High immediacy: The solution should not take too long
to detect a jamming attack.
• Signal filter: a solution should be able to filter out
legitimate signals among jamming signals.
Existing Defense Strategies against Attack Model 2:
Stottelaar [107] suggested several countermeasures such as
using V2V communications to gather additional information,
changing the wavelength frequently, using multiple LiDAR
sensors with different wavelengths, and shortening the ping
period (the time window that a sensor waits for the signal to
come back). However, these countermeasures all have disad-
vantages. Vehicle-to-vehicle communication may not always
be available. Using multiple LiDAR devices is expensive.
The shortened ping period makes a device prone to errors.
Changing wavelength frequently may not be effective against
attackers who can follow a CAV for a while, as acknowledged
by the author. Wang et al. (2015) proposed a novel LiDAR
scheme called pseudo-random modulation (PMQSL) quantum
secured LiDAR [42]. The PMQSL scheme is based on random
modulation technique. The random modulation is a technique
in the time domain, which is a typical way to recover the
weak signal buried in random noise. The transmitting signal
is modulated by the digital pulse codes, usually consisting of
on and off. The nth order M-sequence ai with elements 1 or
0 is generated by a set of n-stage shift registers. The laser is
pulse-position modulated by an electro-optic modulator. These
pulses are further randomly modulated to create the horizontal,
diagonal, vertical, and anti-diagonal polarization states of the
photon through a polarization modulated model. When there
is no jamming attack, four different distances corresponding
to the four measured polarizations have very small error rates.
In the presence of jamming attacks, the four distances have
considerable error in the received polarization. The increase in
error allows the system to determine that the LiDAR device
was being jammed. The authors claimed that this LiDAR
scheme can efficiently detect a jamming attack, but cannot
filter out legitimate signals among jamming signals.
Challenges for defending against Attack Model 2: We
have not found any study or experiment that demonstrates
LiDAR jamming on a moving autonomous vehicle, as in
Attack Model 1. Such a study will be interesting since we
can observe the real effectiveness of Attack Model 2. Besides,
defense strategies proposed in [42] and [43] need to be tested
for CAVs because they were not specifically developed CAVs.
E. Attacks on radar
Attack Model 1 - Radar spoofing: Attackers replicate and
rebroadcast radar signals to inject distorted data to the sensor.
A common tool to perform this attack model is Digital radio
frequency memory (DRFM), which is an electronic method to
store radio frequency and microwave signals by using high-
speed sampling and digital memory [108]. The phase of stored
signals can then be modified and the signals are then re-
broadcasted to the radar sensor. The falsified signals can then
cause incorrect calculations of distance to surrounding objects.
Chauhan (2014) [109] experimented with this attack model on
a radar device (Ettus Research USRP N210) and managed to
make an object from a 121-meter distance appear at a 15-
meter distance. Yan et al. (2016) [37] discussed the same
idea of the attack but unfortunately, they did not have the
resource to implement the attack. Instead, they attempted to
inject counterfeit signals to a radar sensor on a Tesla Model S.
The attempt was not successful because the sensor has a low
ratio of working time over idle time, which makes it difficult
to inject signals at the precise time slot.
Criteria for Defense Strategies against Attack Model 1:
Based on our understanding of the attack model and study on
the defense techniques, we suggest the following criteria.
• Attack Detection: The solution should be able to detect
a radar spoofing attack in a timely manner.
• Signal Filter: The solution should be able to filter out
the attack signals and derives accurate distance measure-
ments.
• Consistency: The solution should be able to achieve the
previous two criteria under many circumstances and over
a long period of time.
• Non-disruptivity: The solution should not affect other
services of a vehicle.
Existing Defense Strategies against Attack Model 1: A
novel approach, called physical challenge-response authenti-
cation (PyCRA) (2015) [110], inspects the surrounding envi-
ronment by sending randomized probing signals, called chal-
lenging signals. PyCRA shuts down the actual sensing signals
at random times and assumes that attackers cannot detect chal-
lenging signals immediately. Under that assumption, PyCRA
can detect malicious signals by determining if they are higher
than a noise threshold during a period with the Chi-square test.
Kapoor et al. (2018) [111] criticized PyCRA that PyCRA may
severely affect the safety-critical CAV components, such as
adaptive cruise control and collision warning, because they are
shut down at random times. Another shortcoming of PyCRA
is that after the first 30 seconds following an attack, The
derived distance is continuously longer than the actual distance
[111], thus PyCRA falls short of the Consistency criteria.
Dutta et al. (2017) [112] attempted to address PyCRA’s
problems with consistency and non-disruptivity by introducing
the Challenge Response Authentication method (CRA). CRA
works by applying the recursive least square method to provide
the estimated distance by minimizing the sum of square of
errors, which is defined as the difference between the predicted
distance and the actual distance. According to Dutta et al.,
CRA may satisfy all four aforementioned criteria. However,
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Kapoor et al. criticized that CRA may not be effective in
practice because it relies on the assumption that the actual
distance is known [111]. Kapoor et al. proposed a new method
called Spatio-Temporal Challenge-Response (STCR). STCR
uses the same idea as PyCRA, but instead of shutting down
sensing signals, it transmits challenging signals randomized
directions. Reflected challenging signals can be used to iden-
tify directions that reflect malicious signals, then excludes
the untrustworthy directions when measuring the surrounding
environment. According to [111], STCR is able to detect
attacks and measure the actual distance consistently and in
a timely manner.
Challenges for defending against Attack Model 1: Yan
et al. [37] failed to apply the DRFM technique to inject
counterfeit signals to a radar sensor because the sensor has
a low ratio of working time over idle time. However, it was
unclear from their publication whether this is the characteristic
that all CAVs’ radar sensors share, and whether an attacker
can find a way to overcome this problem. Further experiments
are needed to answer this question. Besides, Kapoor et al.’s
defense method [111] is the state-of-the-art technique but has
not been validated in an experiment.
Attack Model 2 - Radar jamming: This attack model can
also be carried out by using DRFM, but instead of modifying
phase, attackers can modify frequency and amplitude of the
stored signals before rebroadcasting to the radar sensors. The
falsified signals can make the radar sensors fail to detect
the object, at which the jamming device is located. We have
not found any publication that experimented with this attack
model on CAVs. However, this attack model is widely used
by manned and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to hide them-
selves from radar detection [113]–[115]. Since these attacks
have only been applied to UAVs and not CAVs, we are not
certain about their feasibility on CAVs and thus cannot make
claims about criteria for defense strategies.
Existing Defense Strategies against Attack Model 2:
Similar to the attack model, defense strategies are widely
studied for UAVs, but none has been discussed for CAVs. To
defend against this attack model, one can attempt to separate
the legitimate signals from the counterfeit signals. The specific
methods are described in [43], [116]–[118].
Challenges for defending against Attack Model 2: Further
studies on both attacks and defense techniques are needed
to investigate whether the attacks are feasible on CAVs and
whether the defense techniques are also effective on CAVs.
F. Attacks on GPS
Attack Model 1 - GPS Spoofing: An attacker broadcasts
incorrect, but realistic GPS signals to mislead GPS receivers
on CAVs. This is also known as a GPS Spoofing attack.
In this attack model, attackers begin by broadcasting signals
that are identical to the satellites’ legitimate signals. The
attackers then gradually increase the power of his signals
and gradually deviate their GPS signals from the target’s true
location. GPS receivers are often configured to make use of
signals with the strongest magnitudes [119]. Therefore, once
the counterfeit signal is stronger than the legitimate satellite
signal, GPS devices would choose to process the counterfeit
signal. Tippenhauer et al. (2011) described in detail how to
perform a GPS Spoofing attack and the requirements for a
successful attack [120]. They found that an attacker must be
able to calculate the distance from himself to the victim with
an error of at most 22.5 meters. Whether this condition could
be met on a moving CAV is still unclear. We have not found
any successful GPS spoofing attack on CAV published in the
literature. However, attacks on other transportation means are
available. For instance, in 2014, Psiaki et al. [121] successfully
spoofed GPS signals to a superyacht’s and reported counterfeit
locations to the crew. The crew then attempted to correct the
course, only to deviate from the correct course. Shepard et al.
(2012) [122] used a civilian GPS spoofer to successfully create
a significant timing error in a phasor measurement unit, which
is a component of GPS devices responsible for estimating the
magnitude and phase angle of GPS signals. Zeng et al. (2018)
[123] assembled a small device from popular components with
a total cost of 223 US Dollars and used it to trigger fake turn-
by-turn navigation to guide victims to a wrong destination
without being noticed. The authors demonstrated the attacks
on real cars with 40 participants and were able to guide
38 participants to the authors’ predetermined locations (95%
success rate). Zeng et al. discussed one of the limitations of
their study is that it is not effective if a driver is familiar with
the area. However, this may not be the case for CAVs and
thus Zeng et al.’s attack model would pose a significant threat
to CAVs. Recently, Regulus Cyber LTD. tested GPS spoofing
on a Tesla 3 and successfully made the car’s GPS display
false positions on the map, and hence any attempt to find
a route to a destination resulted in bad navigation [39]. The
total equipment cost to perform this attack was 550 US Dollars
and the report also stated that “this dangerous technology is
everywhere“. Unfortunately for those who are curious, the
researchers did not perform an attack when the car was on
an autopilot mode. Narain et al. (2019) [124] proposed an
interesting approach for attackers. They first looked for data
on regular patterns that exist in many cities’ road networks.
Then, they used an algorithm to exploit the regular patterns and
identify navigation paths that are similar to the original route
(assuming that the attackers know the victim’s route). Finally,
the identified paths can be forced onto a target CAV through
spoofed GPS signals. This attack model allows attackers to
possibly bypass some defense mechanisms, such as the Inertial
Navigation System (INS), which helps GPS receivers to get
positions and angle updates at a quicker rate [125], [126]. The
inconsistencies between the spoofed path and the original path
may be negligible and the attack can be successfully executed.
Also in 2019, Meng et al published an open-source GPS-
spoofing generator using Software-Defined Receiver [127].
The authors claimed that their spoofing generator can cover all
open-sky satellites while providing high-quality concealment,
thus it can block all the legitimate signals. This would make
the spoofing signals closely similar to that of the legitimate
signal. Therefore, it would be difficult to detect this attack
based on only the differences with surrounding GPS receivers
or the signal consistency. The threat of this spoofing model to
CAVs is very serious once all signals from the visible GPS
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satellites are spoofed [127].
Criteria for Defense Strategies against Attack Model 1:
Haider and Khalid (2016) [20] proposed the following criteria
for effective defense strategies:
• Quick Implementation: The solution can be implemented
easily.
• Cost Effective: The solution should be affordable in either
a small scale or a large scale.
• Prevent Simple Attack: ability to detect simple attacks.
• Prevent Intermediate Attacks: ability to detect intermedi-
ate type of attacks.
• Prevent Sophisticated Attacks: ability to detect sophisti-
cated and advanced types of attacks, such as [124], [127].
• No Requirements to modify satellite transmitters: the
solution does not require changes to be made on the
satellite transmitters.
• Validation: the solution is easy to test.
• Interoperability: The solution works on many types of
machines (we are only concerning about CAVs in this
context).
Existing Defense Strategies against Attack Model 1: In
2003, the United States Department of Energy suggested seven
simple countermeasures to detect GPS spoofing attacks [128].
The seven countermeasures are:
• Monitor the absolute GPS signal strength: by recording
and monitoring the average signal strength, a system
may detect a GPS spoofing attack by observing that
signal strengths are many orders of magnitude larger than
normal signals from GPS satellites.
• Monitor the relative GPS signal strength: the receiver
software could be programmed to record and compare
signals in consecutive time frames. A large change in
relative signal strength would be an indication of a
spoofing attack.
• Monitor the signal strength of each received satellite
signal: the relative and absolute signal strengths are
recorded and monitored individually for each of the GPS
satellites.
• Monitor satellite identification codes and number of
satellite signals received: GPS spoofers typically transmit
signals that contain tens of identification code, whereas
legitimate GPS signals on the field often come from a
few satellites. Keeping track of the number of satellite
signals received and the satellite identification codes may
help determine a spoofing attack.
• Check the time intervals: with most GPS spoofers, the
time between signals is constant. This is not the case with
real satellites. Keeping track of the time intervals between
signals may be useful in detecting spoofing attack.
• Do a time comparison: Many GPS receivers do not have
an accurate clock. By using timing data from an accurate
clock to compare to the time derived from the GPS
signals, we can check the veracity of the received GPS
signals.
• Perform a sanity check: by using accelerometer and
compass, a system can independently monitor and double
check the position reported by the GPS receiver.
All of the above seven countermeasures are simple and
inexpensive to implement, may prevent simple attacks, do not
require modification to satellite transmitters, and are inter-
operable. However, they may fall short when dealing with
sophisticated attacks such as [124], [127].
Defense strategies against GPS spoofing attacks have also
been studied extensively in the academic literature. Since GPS
signals do not contain any information that can verify their
integrity, a natural way to defend against Attack Model 1
is to use redundant information to verify the integrity of
GPS signals. One example of such a method is the Receiver
autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM), a technology that
uses redundant signals from multiple GPS satellites to produce
several GPS position fixes and compare them [129], [130].
A RAIM system is considered available if it can receive
signals from 24 or more GPS satellites [131], [132]. RAIM
statistically determines whether GPS signals are faulty or
malicious by using the pseudo-range measurement residual,
which is the difference between the observed measurement
and the expected measurement [40]. Advanced Receiver Au-
tonomous Integrity Monitoring (ARAIM) is a concept that
extends RAIM to other constellations beyond GPS, such as
GLObal NAvigation Satellite System (GLONASS), Galileo,
and compass [133], [134]. One criticism with ARAIM is
that its availability is inconsistent if one or more satellites
are not reachable [131], [135]. Meng et al. (2018) proposed
solutions for this problem and improved ARAIM availability
up to 98.75% [135], [136]. There are many other validation
mechanisms, which all make use of additional satellites or
side-channel information. For example, O’Hanlon et al. de-
scribed how to estimate the expected GPS signal strength and
compared against the observed signal strength to validate GPS
signals [41]. Furthermore, a defense system can monitor GPS
signals to ensure that the rate of change is within a threshold.
Montgomery proposed a defense approach that uses a dual
antenna receiver that employs a receiver-autonomous angle-
of-arrival spoofing countermeasure [137]. The main idea is to
measure the difference in the signal’s phase between multiple
antennas referenced to a common oscillator. Other examples of
countermeasures can be found in the survey paper by Haider
and Khalid (2016) [20].
Challenges for defending against Attack Model 1: Even
though several countermeasures have been proposed in the
literature, their effectiveness against newer attack strategies,
such as [124], [127] (2019), is unknown. The attack strategy
in [127] is especially dangerous for CAVs. Therefore, finding
effective countermeasures for these 2019-born attack models
is a current research challenge.
Attack Model 2 - GPS jamming: Since radio signals from
the satellites are generally weak, jamming can be achieved
by firing strong signals that overwhelm GPS receiver, so that
the legitimate signals can not be detected [138]. Examples
that highlight the risks of GPS jamming have been reported.
In 2013, a New Jersey man was arrested for using a $100
GPS jamming device plugged into the cigarette lighter in
his company truck [139]. The man’s motive was to jam
his company truck’s GPS signal to hide from his employer.
However, the device was reported to be powerful enough to
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interfere with GPS signals at the nearby Newark airport. Even
though GPS jamming devices are illegal for civilian use, they
can easily be found on online retailers such as eBay [140].
GPS jamming is less dangerous than GPS spoofing in the
sense that attackers have higher control over GPS receivers
with a spoofing attack. However, GPS jamming attack can
cause disruptions of service and is essentially a Denial-of-
Service attack.
Criteria for Defense Strategies against Attack Model 2:
Based on our understanding of the attack model and study on
the defense techniques, we suggest the following criteria.
• Attack Detection: The solution should be able to detect
a jamming attack in a timely manner to ensure the safety
of CAVs.
• Signal Filter: The solution should be able to filter out the
attack signals so that the vehicle can still operate under
certain attack scenarios and avoid disruption of service.
Existing Defense Strategies against Attack Model 2:
Many GPS receiver modules have implemented anti-jamming
measures that target unintentional interference from every-
day electronic devices. However, Hunkeler et al. (2012) [141]
have shown that these countermeasures are ineffective against
intentional attacks. For example, the NEO-6 GPS receiver has
an integrated anti-jamming module that provides data to assess
the likelihood that a jamming attack is ongoing. Hunkeler et
al. showed that the parasitic signal from the GPS jammer
interfered with the NEO-6 receiver in such a way that the
receiver could not function while the anti-jamming module
reported very low probability for a jamming attack. Several
studies have demonstrated how calculate the probability of
intentional GPS jamming attack just by using information
from GPS receivers [141]–[143]. Unfortunately, detection of
GPS jamming does not prevent disruption of service, which
is the main objective of a GPS jamming attack. L3Harris
Technologies, Inc. developed a technology, Excelis Sentry
1000, that can detect sources of interference to support timely
and effective actionable intelligence [144]. The Excelis Sentry
1000 systems can be strategically placed around high-risk
areas to instantaneously sense and triangulate the location of
jamming sources [140]. However, this defense strategy may
not be effective for CAVs, whose operating location is not
predictable.
Mukhopadhyay (2007) [145] and Purwar et al. (2016) [146]
proposed methods to reduce the jamming signals and estimate
the legitimate GPS signals. Mukhopadhyay used a the Adap-
tive Array Antenna technology and the Least Mean Squared
(LMS) algorithm to maximize the chance of collecting the de-
sired signals and the chance of rejecting jamming signals. The
Adaptive Array Antenna technology are antenna arrays that
have integrated signal processing algorithms that can identify
spatial signal signatures such as the direction of arrival (DOA)
of the signal, and use them to calculate beamforming vectors
in order to track and locate the antenna beam. Mukhopadhyay
used the LMS algorithm, which is a member of a family of
stochastic gradient algorithms, to further accurately calculate
the DOA. The DOA information would then contribute to
determining the signals being rejected or accepted. Purwar
et al. (2016) [146] proposed the Turbo Coding method for
counter jamming. In Turbo Coding, The Turbo encoder at the
GPS satellites that send the original GPS data is encoded,
then modulated, and passed over a noisy channel. Then, the
encoded data arrives at the GPS receivers along with noise
and jamming signals. The receiver demodulates the distorted
GPS signals and then the Turbo Decoder decodes demodulated
signals to retrieve the original GPS signals. This technique has
two major weaknesses. First, the results in [146] demonstrated
that as the strength of jamming signals increases, their method
becomes less effective. Specifically, when the jamming signals
is about 14 times stronger than the legitimate signals, the
method cannot recover the legitimate signals. Second, this
method requires modification to the GPS satellites.
Challenges for defending against Attack Model 2: The
state-of-the-art countermeasure was published by Purwar et
al. (2016) [146]. It has two major weaknesses that would be
problematic to be implemented for CAVs. The method requires
modification to the GPS satellites and is only effective if the
jamming signals are not too strong.
G. Attacks on cameras
Attack Model 1 - Camera blinding: On CAVs, cameras
commonly provide inputs for deep learning models for the task
of object detection. Attackers aim for a denial of this service
by blinding a camera with extra light. Petit et al. (2014) [36]
experimented with a blinding attack on a MobilEye C2-270
camera installed on a non-automated car’s windshield. The
researchers showed that a quick burst of 650 nm laser was
able to almost fully blind the camera and the camera never
recovered from the blindness. The 940 nm 5x5 LED matrix
and 850 nm LED spot also achieved the same result, but the
camera was able to recover after more than 5 seconds. It is
important to note that the MobilEye C2-270 camera is not
used for full vehicle automation (SAE Level 5) but function-
specific automation (SAE Level 1 to 3). Yan et al. (2016) [37]
experimented with similar attacks and was also able to blind a
camera permanently (the authors did not specify the camera).
This paper also pointed out that LED and Laser beam could
blind a camera but Infrared LED could not because of the
narrow frequency band filters. We have not found any other
study on this attack model.
Criteria for Defense Strategies against Attack Model 1:
Based on our understanding of the attack model and study on
the defense techniques, we suggest the following criteria.
• Low cost: The solution should not require expensive
modification to the vehicle
• Generalization: The solution should work on as many
attack wavelengths as possible. Petit et al. and Yan et
al. showed that this attack model is possible for laser and
LED with different wavelengths. A solution that works
for all attack wavelengths would be ideal.
Existing Defense Strategies against Attack Model 1: Petit
et al. [36] also suggested two countermeasures in their study.
The first countermeasure is to use redundancy by installing
multiple cameras that have overlapping coverage. This is
effective because laser and LED spot have small beam width,
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making it difficult to attack multiple cameras spontaneously.
This defense strategy cannot mitigate the risk of Attack Model
1 completely, but it makes attackers spend more effort on
a successful attack. Nevertheless, the cost to implement this
solution grows in direct proportion to the number of extra cam-
eras. The second countermeasure is to integrate a removable
near-infrared-cut filter into a camera. This is a technology that
is available on security cameras and can filter near-infrared
light on request. This solution can potentially satisfy both
criteria, but would need implementation and experiments to be
verified. In 2020, DH and Ansari proposed a detection method
by using predictive analytics to predict the future next frames
captured by the cameras and then compare the received frames
with the predicted frames [147]. DH and Ansari’s solution has
the potential to satisfy both the criteria we mentioned.
Challenges for defending against Attack Model 1: Petit
et al.’s suggested countermeasures are the only ones that we
found in the literature. Yan et al, (2016) [37] did not discuss
any countermeasure in their experiment. Petit et al.’s proposed
strategy of using near-infrared-cut filter into cameras has
high potential, but need further experiments and validations.
Similarly, DH and Ansari’s solution has the potential to be a
generalized solution and may be implemented easily, but need
further validations due to its newness.
Attack Model 2 - Adversarial Images: An adversary may
carefully make small perturbations on the images that cam-
eras observe and cause the artificial-intelligence algorithms
(used for CAV’s vision) to generate incorrect predictions.
Even though the ultimate targets of this type of attack are
the deep learning models that reside in ECUs, cameras are
convenient channels for attackers to inject adversarial images.
In 2017, Google researchers were able to create stickers called
adversarial patch [148] with patterns that can deceive artificial
intelligence algorithms. These stickers may be printed out
and attached to important transportation objects, such as road
signs. Lu et al. (2017) [149] experimented such an attack by
taking 180 photos of compromised stop signs with an iPhone
7 from a moving vehicle. They found that a trained neural
network classified most of the pictures correctly, which meant
that the attack model was not effective. In contrast, Eykholt
et al. (2018) [150] were a lot more successful with their
experiments. They experimented with a camera in a lab setting
and a camera on a moving vehicle (non-CAV). By decorating
stop signs with small black-and-white stickers, the authors
made a state-of-the-art algorithm fail to recognize the stop
signs 100% of the time in a lab setting and 84.8% on a moving
vehicle. Li and Gerdes (2019) [151] experimented with the
same type of attack by using electromagnetic interference in a
remote manner and without physical modification to the stop
signs, which makes the attack easier to launch and harder
to detect. We have not found any experiment on CAVs, but
this attack model, as demonstrated in a moving vehicle setting
[150], should also apply to CAVs. There are several methods
that attackers can use to know how to tamper with objects such
as road signs. These methods are called universal adversarial
perturbations and are described in [44], [152]–[154]. Recently,
an IBM research group released an open-source Python library,
called Adversarial Robustness 360 Toolbox, for generating and
defending against adversarial images [155]. This attack model
is especially dangerous because it may make CAVs ignore
alerts or read the wrong speed limits from road signs.
Criteria for Defense Strategies against Attack Model 2:
Based on our understanding of the attack model and study on
the defense techniques, we suggest the following criteria.
• Low cost and easy implementation: The solution should
not require expensive modification to the vehicle
• Generalization: The solution should work on many types
of image perturbations.
• Computationally efficient: The solution should be calcu-
lated efficiently to serve real-time object-detection pur-
poses.
Existing Defense Strategies against Attack Model 2
Securing Machine Learning models against adversarial images
have been discussed extensively. This can be achieved by
several techniques such as pre-processing inputs [156]–[159],
adding adversarial samples to training data [160]–[162], and
utilizing run-time information to detect abnormal inputs [163].
All of these methods are algorithm-based and can probably
be integrated into the codes on the ECUs that handle object-
detection from camera data. To our knowledge, no research has
studied the extent of generalization of these algorithms, as well
as their theoretical and practical computational complexity.
Such a comparison study for these defense techniques should
be performed for further discussions on this topic.
Challenges for defending against Attack Model 2: The
attack and defense of Attack Model 2 have been studied
extensively in terms of methodologies and have been tested
with general images. A comparison study for these defense
techniques in terms of generalization and computational effi-
ciency should be performed to server further discussions on
this topic.
H. Attacks on communication mechanisms
Attack Model 1 - Falsified information: Attackers aim to
send falsified information through the V2V and V2I commu-
nications to disrupt CAVs’ operation and traffic flow. This can
be achieved by impersonation or Sybil attacks. In an imper-
sonation attack, attackers steal the identity of legitimate CAVs
and broadcast falsified information. This could be achieved if
the connection protocol lacks a strong authentication method.
Chim et al. (2009) [164] described in detail one way to
impersonate another CAV’s identity in section IV of their
paper. In a Sybil attack, attackers create a large number of
identities and use them to send falsified information over
a network and make the falsified information appear to be
popular and legitimate. For example, Rawat et al. (2019)
[165] described a scenario in a VANET network, where fake
identities are made to look like they surround a target vehicle,
making the target vehicle think that there is a traffic jam.
Criteria for Defense Strategies against Attack Model 1:
This attack model can be mitigated by implementing strong
authentication methods that may be specified in the V2V and
V2I network protocols. Based on our understanding of the
attack model and study on the defense techniques, we suggest
the following criteria.
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• Low cost and easy implementation: Solutions that are
easier to implement and cost less are preferable.
• Computationally efficient: The solution should be calcu-
lated efficiently to serve real-time authentication.
Existing Defense Strategies against Attack Model 1:
Several authentication methods have been proposed, such as
[166]–[168]. Grover et al. (2011) [166] proposed an authenti-
cation scheme that uses neighboring vehicles in VANET. There
are four phases:
• Periodic Communication: each vehicle on the road pe-
riodically broadcasts and receives beacon packets. This
phase is to announce a vehicle’s presence to all vehicles
on the road.
• Group construction of neighboring nodes: when a vehicle
collects enough beacon messages from other vehicles,
it makes a record of neighboring nodes in the form of
groups at regular intervals of time.
• Exchange groups with other nodes in vicinity: after
significant duration of time, these vehicles exchange their
neighboring nodes record with each other in vicinity.
• Identify the vehicles comprising similar neighboring
nodes: after receiving the records from other vehicles,
each vehicles may detect malicious vehicles by observing
that the abnormal vehicles exist in neighboring nodes for
duration greater than a threshold.
Grover’s approach may satisfy both of aforementioned criteria,
but may fall short when there are not enough vehicles on the
road to exchange information. Whyte et al. (2013) [167] pro-
posed the Security Credential Management System (SCMS)
that implements a public-key infrastructure (PKI) with some
features for providing privacy. The PKI is used to authenticate
vehicles through V2I connections. Two major drawbacks of
this approach are that a PKIs are expensive to implement,
and that V2I communication may add significant delays to
the authentication process. Alimohammadi et al. (2015) [168]
proposed a secure protocol based on a light weight group
signature scheme. For a short time and secure group com-
munication, the Boneh-Shacham algorithm is used for short
group signature scheme and batch verification. Hubaux (2004)
[169] suggested that all vehicles use electronic license plates to
allow the wireless authentication of CAVs. Zhang et al. (2008)
[170] proposed an authentication scheme that would efficiently
authenticate CAVs by using some roadside infrastructures.
However, Chim et al. (2009) [164] claimed that their attack
model would penetrate Zhang et al.’s method. In 2020, Zhao
et al. [171] proposed a protection mechanism that consists
of an offline phase and an online phase. The offline phase
establishes matrices and parameters to support attack detection
and decision making during the online phase. All the methods
that require PKI and roadside infrastructures are costly and
difficult to implement.
Challenges for defending against Attack Model 1: Strong
authentication methods that are based on public-key encryption
would require a public key infrastructure. However, as van der
Heijden et al. (2018) discussed [23], PKIs suffer from prob-
lems such as being expensive to implement in a large region
and may not provide real-time authentication. Furthermore,
Chim et al. [164] pointed out that the processing units on
CAVs may not be able to process the authenticating messages
in real time.
Attack Model 2 - Denial of Service: Attackers perform
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack and Distributed Denial-of-
Service (DDoS) attack on the communication mechanisms.
Several studies have demonstrated how VANETS and V2I net-
works are vulnerable to DoS and DDoS attacks [172]–[175].
All of these attacks are intended to confuse CAVs’ operations
and disrupt traffic flows. DDoS attacks on V2I networks are
likely to disrupt transportation in a large region, especially
if the infrastructure provides critical information to control
traffic flows. Ekedebe et al. (2015) [176] experimented with
DoS attacks on V2I network by using a simulated environment
and showed that DoS attacks can prevent all messages from
being sent to vehicles in the network. V2V networks are
also possible targets for DoS and DDoS attacks because they
have limited connection bandwidth. For example, the DSRC
standard specifies that a node must wait to transmit signals
until the DSRC channel is idle [177]. To exploit this limitation,
attackers may constantly transmit noises through the DSRC
channel to keep it always busy and thus to prevent legitimate
signals from being delivered. Leinimuller et al. (2006) [178]
described another variation of DoS attacks on V2V networks,
where an adversarial vehicle in a VANET network can falsify
its position information to intercept message packets between
other vehicles in the network.
Existing Defense Strategies against Attack Model 2:
Defending against DoS and DDoS attacks on V2I and V2V
network requires a secured V2I or V2V network architecture
and protocols. Just like DoS attacks on V2I networks resemble
those on a traditional centralized network, defending strategies
for a traditional centralized network can be applied to defend
V2I networks. The defense strategies for a general centralized
network can be found in Douligeris’s survey paper (2004)
[174], which include intrusion prevention, intrusion detection,
intrusion response, and intrusion tolerance techniques. Singh et
al. (2018) [179] discussed a machine-learning based approach
to detect DDoS attacks on V2I networks. Besides this study,
We have not found any other study that is specific for
V2I networks. To secure V2V networks, several papers have
proposed secured architecture. For example, Blum et al. (2006)
[177] proposed the CARAVAN architecture, Plossl (2016)
[180] proposed an architecture that uses a certified GALILEO
receiver to achieve reliable time and position information,
Hubaux (2004) [169] suggested using electronic license plates
to authenticate CAVs.
Challenges for defending against Attack Model 2: All the
aforementioned studies are based on theoretical frameworks
and have not been tested in a realistic CAV environment.
An experimental study, even if performed on simulated but
realistic data, would be valuable to determine suitable methods
to defend against DoS and DDoS attacks on V2V and V2I
networks.
IV. RESEARCH CHALLENGES, TRENDS, AND OPEN ISSUES
In this section, we first highlight the challenges and research
trends that we have observed and discussed in sections II and
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III. These observations all came from academic research. Next,
we present official publications and reports from the industry
that are related to the cybersecurity of CAVs. We searched for
publications and reports from corporations that are involved
in the developments of CAVs.
A. Academic Research
Research trends: We have observed the following research
trends happening on the topic of security of CAVs.
• The trend in developing new attack models largely fol-
lows the remote attack pattern by targeting sensors,
cameras, and communication mechanisms. We have ob-
served that most of the recently developed attacks can
be performed from a remote distance, either from the
roadside or from other vehicles. Examples of such attack
can be found in [36], [124], [127], [172].
• The trend in developing new defense strategies is to
utilize machine learning and anomaly-based intrusion
detection systems. The requirements for new defense
strategies often include the capability of real-time re-
sponse, low expense, and less modification to CAVs’
architecture.
• There is an obvious need to develop secured mechanisms
to update the software on ECUs. All the current updating
mechanisms are easily abused by attackers to compromise
CAVs, such as those attack models mentioned in [99],
[101].
• A decentralized public key infrastructure (PKI) will be
necessary to improve the security of V2V and V2I
communications [23], [181]. While operating, a CAV may
meet many other CAVs in a short time and may need to
exchange information through V2V communications. To
mitigate the attack model 1 discussed in section III-H, au-
thentication based on public-key encryption is necessary.
To achieve this, a CAV will need to request the public
key of other CAVS from a PKI. Decentralizing PKI is
necessary to reduce the latency before the vehicle receives
the necessary keys to achieve real-time authentication.
Research Challenges: From the research challenges dis-
cussed in section III, we organize three categories for the
open security issues on CAVs. The specific challenges and
their related publications are presented in Table III.
• Unsolved attack models: there are several attack models
in the literature that we have not found a corresponding
defense strategy in the literature. Some of these attack
models pose significant and realistic threats to CAVs,
such as the GPS Spoofing methods discussed in [127]
and [124], both published in 2019. These challenges are
presented in the first column of Table III.
• Attack models needing further experiments: there are
recently developed attack models that we are unable to
assess the level of threat and effectiveness in a realis-
tic environment of CAVs. Further experiments under a
realistic environment will provide the community with a
better understanding of the impact of these attack models
and incentivize research for defense strategies. These
challenges are presented in the second column of Table
III.
• Defense strategies needing further experiments: there
are many defense strategies proposed only theoretically
or have only been tested under unrealistically simulated
environments. Further experiments under realistic envi-
ronment will help validate these strategies and identify
the most suitable ones. These challenges are presented in
the third column of Table III.
B. Industrial development
In July 2019, a coalition of 11 companies that are involved
in the development of CAVs published a whitepaper titled
“Safety First For Automated Driving“ [182]. The 11 compa-
nies include Audi, Intel, Volkswagen, Baidu, BMW, Aptiv,
Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, Daimler, Continental, Infineon,
and HERE. The whitepaper describes a thorough approach to
make CAVs operate safer, of which security is a subtopic. With
this publication, the authors aimed to build a guideline for
the development of safer and more secure CAVs. The authors
claimed to continuously update this whitepaper by including
detailed solutions for defined problems in the future. They
hope that the whitepaper will become an international standard
for the development of CAVs. Regarding security issues, the
whitepaper [182] recommends two approaches:
• Using Secure Development Lifecycle (SDL), which is a
process for integrating security into the product develop-
ment and product maintenance processes. SDL practices
are divided into preliminaries, development, and sustain-
ment. Regarding preliminaries, a CAV development team
is required to be sufficiently trained with knowledge
of security issues, policies, procedures, and guidelines.
Development includes security practices in software en-
gineering, such as code review, penetration testing, and
threat modeling. Sustainment practices ensure that CAVs
continue to operate safely after release by having an ef-
fective incident response system and continuous updates.
• Regarding the machine learning models embedded in
CAVs, the authors conducted a brief survey on the
challenges of building safety-ensured machine learning
models and suggested many guidelines. This section is
presented in Appendix B of the whitepaper [182]. In
short, the guidelines involve the processes of selecting
data for model training and testing, architecture design
of models, model evaluation, and deployment and moni-
toring. Interestingly, we think that building defense mech-
anisms against adversarial image attacks (section 3E,
attack model 2) fits into the paradigm of data selection
and model validation that the whitepaper describes.
Another coalition of Ford, Lyft, Uber, Volvo, and Waymo,
named the Self-Driving Coalition for Safer Streets also pre-
sented several publications related to CAV’s security on their
website [183]. Most notable is Waymo’s safety report titled
“On the Road to Fully Self-Driving“ [184]. The report claimed
that Waymo applied approached such as building redundant
security measures for critical systems and limiting commu-
nication between critical systems. However, the specific im-
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TABLE III
Unsolved attack models Attack models needing further experiments Defense strategies needing further experiments
• No study have proposed a defense
layer to secure the OBD port that
aims to distinguish legitimate from
malicious OBD devices.
• Recently developed GPS Spoofing
techniques [124], [127] still lack an
effective countermeasure
• Several efficient methods to detect
GPS jamming are described in
[141]–[143], but none of them
could filter out the jamming signals
to obtain the legitimate signals.
Maintaining GPS service under
GPS jamming attacks remains a
challenge.
• A strong and efficient
authentication method is necessary
to defend V2V and V2I networks
from Sybil and impersonation
attacks. Public-key encryption can
provide authenticity, but is difficult
to implement on V2V and V2I due
to the reasons presented in [23].
Further studies are needed to find
an adequate solution that overcomes
all the issues discussed in [23].
• The LiDAR jamming attack model discussed
in [107] has not been experimented in a CAV
environment.
• Yan et al. [37] failed to apply the DRFM
technique to inject counterfeit signals to a
radar sensor on a Tesla Model S. Further
experiments are needed to determine whether
this is also the case for other CAVs and
whether the challenges in this attack model
can be overcome.
• Radar jamming attacks have been widely
studied for manned and unmanned aerial ve-
hicles [113]–[115], but have not been exper-
imented on CAVs.
• Although the experiments on GPS jamming
have been demonstrated in [138], [139] and
the jamming devices can be obtained with
relative ease, the potential and threat level
of such an attack on CAVs have not been
studied.
• Many defense strategies have been proposed for
defending against CAN attack through the OBD
port, but most of them receive criticisms [22],
[75], [93]–[95]. A comparison study is needed in
this topic.
• Several IDS-based algorithms have been proposed
to detect abnormal CAN network packets that are
sent from compromised ECUs [18], [92], [95].
However, it is still unclear how effective these
approaches are under a realistic CAV environment.
• Two frameworks are proposed in [97] and [77]
that aim to secure firmware updates over the
air (FOTA). They still need further testings and
experiments.
• Recently proposed defense strategies against Li-
DAR Spoofing ( [105] and [104]) need further
experiments.
• Camera blinding attacks have been successfully
demonstrated on CAVS [36], [37]. Petit et al.’s
countermeasures [36] are the only current counter-
measures against this attack model. Further studies
to validate this defense strategy is needed.
• Adversarial image attacks, as experimented in
[150], [151], have many proposed countermea-
sures in the literature, which can be found in
[155]. Implementation of these countermeasures
need to be validated.
• There exists countermeasures against DDoS at-
tacks on V2V networks [169], [177], [180]. How-
ever, they are all based on theoretical frameworks
and need validation in a realistic CAV environ-
ment.
plementation of these approaches was not described. We have
not found any related safety report from other members of this
coalition.
Regarding secure communication for CAN Bus, Guard-
knox Cyber Technologies Ltd. developed a patented security
approach, named Communication Lockdown, to enforce a
formally verified and deterministic configuration of commu-
nication among the CAN Bus [185]. Guardknox Cyber Tech-
nologies Ltd. claims that this technology can provide zero false
positives with minimal integration and no vehicular hardware
modification.
From our observations, research and implementation of
security issues are in the early stage of development among the
CAV corporations. We have not found any strong connection
between academic research and the industry’s implementation
of CAV-related security issues. There is no evidence to show
that CAVs on the market have been updated to defend against
the novel attack models that the research community has
found.
V. CONCLUSION
Modern innovations of Connected and Autonomous Vehi-
cles (CAVs) are transforming transportation and gaining a lot
of public attention. While CAVs have enormous potentials to
change human life, they pose significant security concerns and
are vulnerable targets for attackers. Therefore, interest in the
security of CAVs has been increasing rapidly. During the last
decade, many attack models and defense strategies for CAVs
have been discussed and experimented with. In this paper, we
studied 184 papers from 2000 to 2019 to understand state-of-
the-art security issues with CAVs. CAVs are prone to attacks
on many of their components. These attacks can render CAVs
out of service or give attackers control over CAVs. Some attack
models are published recently and are seriously threatening
to CAVs. We have presented readers with a comprehensive
review of the security challenges of CAVs and corresponding
state-of-the-art countermeasures. Furthermore, we organized
the attack models based on their target components, access
requirements, and attack motives. Finally, we have identified
some research challenges and future directions that researchers
can contribute to so that CAVs become secure and trustworthy
to the general public.
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